uBlock Origin's element-picker trust failure and secret-token repair
uBlock Origin patched a website-driven picker trust failure.
uBlock Origin patched a website-driven picker trust failure. Raymond Hill's advisory names 1.75.4 as patched; GitHub and Mozilla currently list stable 1.76.4. The reported Firefox MV2 path required a relevant resource-serving filter and a user click. The episode explains the first hardening bypass and the verified-authorization repair without performing an exploit test.
Read the written edition (English) ↗
What this video covers
- Update through normal browser extension controls and check the installed version; an available update does not establish installed protection.
- Raymond Hill's advisory lists 1.75.2 and lower as affected and 1.75.4 as patched; the current stable release is 1.76.4.
- A reachable extension-owned picker needs an explicit authorization boundary before accepting commands that save trusted filters.
- The researcher verified the reported control path but says he did not build the hidden-overlay click trap.
- The first hardening protected a request-method path; the patched picker launch requires verified authorization. Later validation adds protection around saved filters.
- Visuals include original Daily Diff conceptual art and a short silent Nedry/Wayne Knight-like caricature quotation. Its exact animation author and original film-native footage are unverified; source and underlying owners retain copyright, and hosting grants no reuse licence or blanket permission.
Questions and answers
Which uBlock Origin version fixes the reported picker issue?
The maintainer advisory names version 1.75.4 as patched and 1.75.2 and lower as affected. Raymond Hill's repair history dates that patched release to November third. GitHub and Mozilla currently list stable 1.76.4. Use normal browser extension controls to update and check the version actually installed; an available release does not establish that every installation has received it.
How could the reported picker flaw affect another website?
A trusted filter could target another site and run script in that site's context, according to Smitty van Bodegom's report. The hostile page could drive the extension-owned picker to save such a rule. The maintainer advisory scopes the documented path to Firefox MV2, a relevant resource-serving filter and a user click. The episode illustrates that boundary crossing without running the demonstration or testing accounts.
Was the hidden click trap actually built by the researcher?
The researcher says he did not implement the hidden-overlay click trap. Smitty van Bodegom describes hiding or covering the embedded picker so an ordinary click activates its Create button. That proposed concealment and the verified picker-control path have different evidence behind them. His report and the maintainer advisory provide no victim count or evidence of active exploitation; that limits claims made from these sources.
Why did verified authorization improve on the first hardening?
The patched launch checks permission to use the picker instead of relying on protection of its address. Raymond Hill's advisory records a bypass of the first request-method hardening, followed by a release that launches the picker only with a verified secret token. The legitimate extension flow supplies authorization. Later validation adds protection around proposed filters, while the advisory continues to identify 1.75.4 as patched.
What was The Daily Diff's verdict on the picker repair?
The Daily Diff's verdict was SHIP IT. Niko would ship the patched picker because it checks authorization at the control boundary, and would keep the current stable extension installed. That judgment follows Raymond Hill's reported repair history and the distinction between available and installed updates. Future security work stays open; the episode makes no claim that the token check guarantees perfect security or that the show reproduced an exploit.
Transcript
How did a website borrow your ad blocker's authority?
0:00 Your ad blocker is supposed to keep hostile pages out. uBlock Origin's picker let a hostile page write trusted rules. In this video, how did that cross sites? Why did the first fix fail? We'll come back to that first fix. It's Monday, November sixteenth, and this is The Daily Diff. uBlock Origin is a browser extension that blocks unwanted content. This Firefox issue is fixed.
0:21 Update through the browser's normal extension controls and check your installed version. The advisory's patched baseline is one point seventy-five point four. Mozilla currently lists one point seventy-six point four as the stable release, so aim for the current version. Smitty van Bodegom published the report yesterday. Raymond Hill's advisory rates it high severity and dates the private report to
0:39 November first. The path concerns Firefox's older extension architecture, a relevant resource-serving filter, and a click. A scary headline still has prerequisites.
What authority does the picker have?
0:49 The picker lets you select an annoying element and create a blocking rule. Its interface belongs to the extension, even though it appears over the website. That convenient box can ask the extension to save filters. Some filters can inject JavaScript into a matching page. The researcher says picker rules were treated as trusted, at least until recompilation. The dangerous question becomes who gets to drive that interface. A webpage controlling it could borrow the extension's permissions.
1:13 Van Bodegom suspected filter injection and asked GPT five point six Sol to investigate. He says the model found the issue, which he checked and verified. Claude wrote much of the demonstration code. The human still supplied the hypothesis and verification. The extension has resources webpages can load.
Why could a website reach extension resources?
1:30 A filtering feature could return an extension resource instead of an unwanted network response, a harmless substitute for a script the website expects. That compatibility trick also exposed a route to the extension's internal address. Firefox gives the installation a random internal identifier. A malicious page could learn it through that resource path. Once the address was known, the page could load the picker. The hidden address had become a weak gate for a powerful control surface. The picker accepted messages from the page.
1:56 An insufficiently checked field could carry an additional rule beyond the choice the interface appeared to offer. That rule reached the trusted filter store. The friendly element selector had acquired an unfriendly caller, with familiar-looking paperwork.
What does the one-click claim actually establish?
2:08 A user click completes the reported path. Van Bodegom describes hiding or covering the embedded picker so an ordinary click hits its Create button. He says he did not build that hidden-overlay part. The demonstrated control path and proposed click trap deserve separate labels. The consequence extends beyond the starting page. A trusted rule can target another site and run script in that site's context. That's why the report calls this universal cross site scripting.
2:33 Our diagram is conceptual. We haven't run the demonstration or tested anyone's accounts. Recompiling filters could clear that trust, according to the researcher. The attacking page could immediately open the target page. Waiting for a later edit to clean up the rule leaves time for the consequence. A cleanup event is an optimistic security guard. People click webpages all day. Treating a click inside an extension-shaped
2:55 box as informed approval assumes the surrounding page is cooperating. The page is the party we're trying to distrust. Our bouncer has been accepting references from the person outside.
Why did the November second fix fail?
3:05 Hill shipped the first hardening change on November second. It avoided potentially tainted request methods in filtering scripts. The email exchange records a bypass that still exposed the identifier through another part of the request machinery. Closing one address leak left the wrong caller welcome. These sources provide no victim count or evidence of active exploitation. The report also mentions a similar, less problematic issue in uBlock Origin Lite. That separate version and architecture need their own assessment.
3:31 Keep the headline attached to the documented path. The AI victory lap needs brakes. The author's workflow gives us no independent benchmark of autonomous security research. The useful result is the verified report sent to the maintainer and the fixes people can install. Those receipts survive the leaderboard argument.
Which version closes this reported path?
3:48 The advisory names one point seventy-five point four as patched, released on November third. Later changes validated proposed filters and restricted resource-related filters. Today's stable release is newer. Check what's actually installed through the browser controls. Available and installed are different states. Here's the change answering the first-fix question. The November third release launched the picker only with a verified secret
4:10 token. The legitimate extension flow supplies authorization, and the picker checks it. Knowing where the interface lives should leave a webpage outside the permission boundary. The first repair tried to protect the address.
Why does authorized launch beat a hidden address?
4:20 The patched launch verifies permission to use the picker. Later validation layers protect what gets saved. I want a bouncer who checks the invitation, even when everybody knows the venue. The magic word finally has a job. For any extension feature that saves privileged state, ask who is allowed to command it. If you'd rather read this than hear me say it, the diff lands in your inbox
4:40 every morning, free at the daily diff dot dev, link below.
What's the verdict on the repair?
4:43 So today's verdict is SHIP IT. I'd ship the patched picker because it checks authorization at the control boundary, and I'd keep the current stable extension installed. Future security work stays open. Subscribe, hit the bell, and tell me in the comments if you'd have stamped it differently. And that's the diff for today. I'm Niko from Axrisi. Merge responsibly.
Sources
- Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven element pickerSmitty van Bodegom / iter.ca
- Universal XSS from website-driven element pickerRaymond Hill / gorhill/uBlock
- uBlock Origin 1.76.4 releasegorhill/uBlock
- uBlock Origin official Firefox add-on listingMozilla Add-ons / Raymond Hill
- Universal XSS in uBlock Origin discussionHacker News
- Hacking Jurassic Park caricature GIF sourceGIPHY hosting / animation author unverified
- Linked HackerDennis source pagetimbenj / Photobucket source provenance, not verified animation author



